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Abstract
We explore the effects of temporary help employment on welfare recipients’ subsequent
employment and welfare dynamics.  We find that any employment–in temporary help services or
other sectors–yields substantial benefits compared to no employment.  Although welfare
recipients who go to work for temporary help service firms have lower initial wages than those
with jobs in other sectors, they experience faster subsequent wage growth.  Two years later, they
are no less likely to be employed, their wages are close to those of other workers, and they are
only slightly more likely to remain on welfare.
1I. Introduction
Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. welfare system has been evolving from a system
primarily focused on getting qualified individuals registered for cash assistance to one that aims
to help disadvantaged individuals obtain self-sufficiency through employment.  Rather than
focusing solely on documenting eligibility, case workers now must develop a program of training
and employment counseling that will place welfare recipients into jobs.  As this has occurred,
state and local welfare agencies and individuals in need of assistance have increasingly turned to
labor market intermediaries, including temporary help service firms and other public and private
employment agencies, as one way of connecting people with jobs (Pavetti et al., 2000). 
Concerns are being raised, however, about the increased use of temporary help service
firms for placing welfare recipients and other disadvantaged individuals into jobs.  Jobs with
temporary help service firms are frequently less stable, offer fewer fringe benefits, and pay lower
wages than similar jobs in traditional (“end-user”) firms.  Blank (1998) estimates that between 40
percent and 70 percent of temporary help service workers are in what she refers to as “problem”
jobs, jobs that both pay low wages and are relatively less stable.  At least one study finds that a
majority of such workers state that they would prefer traditional employment arrangements
(Cohany, 1998).
On the other hand, for many low-skilled workers employment through labor market
intermediaries may provide a path to permanent and stable employment.  By limiting the extent
of employer commitment, such jobs may provide access to informal training and screening for
workers who might otherwise be excluded from such opportunities.  While a variety of studies
1 For studies characterizing temporary help employment, see Blank (1998), Cohany
(1998), Laird and Williams (1996), Howe (1986), and a series of articles in the October 1996
Monthly Labor Review.
2 Nollen (1996) defines two types of temporary workers: (1) employees of
staffing/temporary help service firms who take short-term assignments at other client companies,
and (2) direct-hire employees of the company where they work who have fixed-term contracts for
temporary work.  Our empirical analyses focus on the former, employees in the temporary help
service industry, since our data allow us to identify industry of employment but not detailed job
characteristics.  Many of the issues we address are relevant for other temporary workers.
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present a picture of the kinds of workers in such positions, little is presently known about the role
that temporary help service employment plays in the career trajectories of welfare recipients.1  
To further examine the effect that temporary help service firms have on the labor market
experiences and outcomes of welfare recipients, we address two main questions: Who among
welfare recipients goes to work for temporary help service firms, and what are the implications of 
temporary employment for their labor market outcomes, compared to those welfare recipients
who are hired directly by the firms in which they work?2  We address these questions using
administrative data on all welfare recipients in Missouri and North Carolina and all employment
covered by unemployment insurance in these two states.  Our data on welfare recipients and
employment begin in 1990 in Missouri and 1995 in North Carolina.  These data include standard
demographic information about individuals, such as age, race, sex and education, as well as total
earnings in a quarter and the industry of their employers.  Using a multinomial logit model we
examine how differences in individual characteristics and past welfare and employment
experience affect the probability of working in a temporary help job relative to either not working
at all or working for a firm in an alternative industry.  We compare the earnings, earnings growth,
and patterns of welfare receipt of welfare recipients who work for temporary help service firms
3with welfare recipients who either do not have jobs or who have jobs with end-user firms,
controlling for individual characteristics.  Finally, we compare the movement of welfare workers
in temporary help firms across industries with the movement of workers who start out in other
industries.
The paper is organized as follows.  In the next section we review relevant literature and
discuss theories about how individuals become matched to jobs in temporary help service firms. 
We describe our data in section III.  In sections IV and V we present results.  We summarize our
results and present conclusions in section VI.
II. Literature Examining the Characteristics of Temporary Workers
Blank’s (1998) findings on the low pay and instability associated with temporary work
are corroborated in a number of studies that describe the characteristics of temporary work. 
Segal and Sullivan (1997a), for example, find that temporary workers are more likely than other
workers to report being underemployed, to work fewer hours, and to have greater variability in
their work schedules and less attachment to the labor force.  They also report that temporary
workers receive 28 percent lower wages than permanent workers.  Nollen (1996) estimates that
the average wages of temporary employees are 35 percent lower than workers in other
occupations.  Houseman and Polivka (1999) also find that workers in temporary arrangements
are considerably more likely than regular part-time workers to change employers or to lose their
jobs and leave the labor force, even when they say they would prefer to work.  In addition,
Cohany (1998) finds that whereas 61 percent of permanent (or “traditional”) workers have health
insurance only 7 percent of temporary workers receive this benefit. 
4A case study of temporary workers reports that these workers cite a number of
“problems” with these jobs, including: uncertainty about income, work hours, and travel costs; a
resulting inability to plan, invest, get credit, or make child care arrangements; money paid up
front for work clothes or safety equipment that might not be used more than a day; unfairly
withheld wages and equipment charges; a lack of job skills training or useful feedback on job
performance; marginal social interactions in the workplace and exploitative actions by temporary
employers; fear that assignments might be withheld if workers’ refused assignments, complained,
or filed workers’ compensation or unemployment insurance claims; and powerlessness in
controlling working conditions (McAllister, 1998).  Welfare recipients frequently face
employment barriers related to child care, transportation, and limited personal and financial
resources for coping with some of these contingencies (Berg, Olson and Conrad, 1991; Pavetti
and Acs, 2001).  It is possible that the problems frequently associated with temporary jobs may
be compounded for welfare recipients, generating special obstacles to self-sufficiency.
An alternative view of temporary work is that workers may choose these jobs because
temporary help jobs best match their preferences or skills.  In addition, the nature of temporary
work may benefit workers who want or need to take extended periods out of the labor force, or
who value nonmarket time highly but are indifferent to its exact timing.  For these people, the
instability or uncertainty of temporary work may not be important disadvantages.  This group
might include some welfare recipients with young children or other family care responsibilities,
and among temporary workers there may be a substantial proportion who fit this profile.  Cohany
(1998) and Morris and Vekker (2001) find that one in three temporary workers prefers their
arrangement to a traditional job.  Among married women with children, Morris and Vekker
5report that 25 percent indicated that they wanted a temporary job for flexibility, shorter hours, to
facilitate child care arrangements, or for other family reasons. 
In terms of individual characteristics, Segal and Sullivan (1997a) find that a large portion
of the temporary/permanent wage gap can be explained by standard worker characteristics known
to be related to wages, or to unmeasured permanent differences in earnings-related
characteristics.  In addition, in explaining the disproportionate representation of African-
Americans among temporary workers, Carre (1992) observes that the group of occupations in
which African-American workers are concentrated in temporary employment corresponds to the
occupations in which African-American workers are concentrated in all industries.  Nollen
(1996) likewise reports that the overall lower wages of temporary employees is a result of their
concentration in relatively low-wage occupations (administrative, clerical, and laborer jobs). 
Thus, the higher concentration of welfare recipients (and other lower-skilled, less educated
workers) in temporary help jobs may in fact reflect a matching process between workers with
fewer productive characteristics and firms or jobs requiring less specific human capital, for
which firms do not wish to establish long-term contracts. 
Furthermore, for those workers with less desirable characteristics, the ability to enter into
a contract where the employer has no long-term obligation may facilitate their access to the labor
market.  As Nollen (1996:575) explains, according to this view, “temporary work gives
opportunities to begin the process of practical human capital development.”  These temporary
jobs in firms that might not otherwise hire these workers could also allow workers a chance to
show that they are productive and possibly lead to permanent jobs with the same employers. 
Based on their analysis of the frequency of transitions from temporary to permanent employment,
6Segal and Sullivan (1997a) find that the size of any “permanent ‘underclass’ of temporary
workers” is likely small. 
Previous research has a number of implications related to our analysis.  First, to the extent
that jobs in temporary help service firms have attributes that better match the preferences and/or
skills of welfare recipients, workers in temporary help jobs will tend to be younger, less
educated, and more likely to be nonwhite.  Also, we expect that workers in temporary help jobs
are more likely to have young children.
We also expect that workers in temporary help jobs will tend to have lower initial wages
relative to workers in other industries.  Insofar as temporary help jobs facilitate matches between
workers and firms that lead to stable, long-term employment relationships, we expect earnings
for these workers to increase faster than for others.  On the other hand, it may be that temporary
help jobs, along with low-wage jobs in general, provide poor future prospects.  Houseman and
Polivka (1999) find that temporary workers are more likely to lose their jobs than workers in
other industries.  Bartik’s (1997) analysis shows that this is also the case among welfare
recipients. If those welfare recipients who go to work in permanent positions stay on the job
longer, benefitting from more work experience and opportunities for general or firm-specific
skills training, we might expect to see this reflected in higher subsequent earnings and earnings
growth rates, compared to those who take temporary jobs.  
In addition, it may be that welfare recipients are being forced to accept jobs in temporary
help, and that these jobs lack the attributes that previous research suggests are crucial to their
successful transition off of welfare and into stable employment — health insurance benefits, paid
time off from work, stable income, and supportive relationships with co-workers and supervisors
7(Blank, 1998; Cohany, 1998; Jorgenson and Riemer, 2000; Morris and Vekker, 2001).  Workers
in temporary help jobs will then be less likely to leave welfare in the future than workers in other
industries, and they may have earnings that are persistently below the earnings of workers in
other industries.  Nonetheless, relative to those not working, welfare recipients who work in
temporary help jobs may have a greater chance of moving off of welfare in subsequent periods.
Two recent studies suggest that temporary jobs do not have serious adverse impacts on
employment and earnings prospects.  In a study of British temporary workers, Booth et al. (2002)
estimate that the impact on current earnings of holding a temporary job is generally less than 10
percent after controlling for the endogeniety of job choice.  For men in temporary jobs, a small
earnings difference remains indefinitely even if they find permanent jobs, but women experience
no long-run earnings loss.  Lane et al. (forthcoming) use a matching technique to examine the
impacts of entry into temporary help employment on earnings, employment and welfare receipt a
year later.  This approach, which controls for a variety of measured characteristics, shows slightly
lower levels of employment and earnings a year later for those who initially obtain temporary
jobs as compared with those in traditional jobs.  There are no significant differences in welfare
receipt, although inferences are limited by the small number of recipients.  Those with any job,
whether temporary or traditional, have much better prospects than those without jobs.  
III.       Data
Our analysis examines cash recipients in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs in the states of Missouri
and North Carolina.  Our data come from records maintained to administer the states’ welfare
3 The payee in a child only case is not a parent and receives payment on behalf of the
children.  Such payees normally do not face work or training requirements, and their income does
not count in the calculation of the benefits.
4 Approximately one in seven jobs held by welfare recipients in Jackson County (the
central county in the Kansas City metropolitan area) is in Kansas.  In St. Louis, the proportion of
individuals holding jobs in Illinois is much lower, reflecting the relatively poor economy in East
St. Louis.
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programs, providing basic demographic and family information on recipient households.  We
focus on female payees, age 18 but less than 65 years, in single parent households and exclude
“child only” cases.3   In most of our analyses, we use quarters as our time unit, so that an
individual who receives AFDC or TANF cash payments at any point during a given quarter is
considered a welfare recipient.
Our examination of employment for welfare recipients relies on earnings data collected
by the states in support of their unemployment insurance programs.  Employers report total
earnings for each individual in covered employment during each quarter, and we merge this
information with records of welfare recipients.  In addition to earnings, employer industry and
several other employer characteristics are available.  While these data omit self-employment,
illegal or informal employment, and a small number of jobs not covered by unemployment
insurance, the overwhelming majority of employment within each state is included.  For welfare
recipients in Missouri, we use employment data collected by the states of Missouri and Kansas,
ensuring employment coverage for welfare recipients in Kansas City, Missouri, who often work
in Kansas.4  For welfare recipients in North Carolina, we use that state’s employment data.  Of
5 Kornfeld and Bloom (1997) compare experimental (job-training program) earnings
impact estimates calculated using unemployment insurance (UI) data with those based on other
more costly earnings data sources and conclude that UI wage data provide valid estimates for all
low income persons except a small subgroup of male youth with past arrests.  See Hotz and
Scholz (2002) for a general discussion of the advantages and limitation of these data for studying
the employment patterns of welfare recipients.
6 We are using data from 1997 for both Missouri and North Carolina because we want to
have information for workers for two years prior to and two years following the sample period. 
Our data in North Carolina begin in 1995, so 1997 is the first year we have the retrospective
information.  Since the Missouri data begin in 1990, we are also able to use data for welfare
recipients in 1993.  
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course, employment will be understated for individuals who move out of state after leaving
welfare.5
Table 1 provides information on the sample of welfare recipients who serve as the basis
for our analysis.  In Missouri, our sample consists of all welfare recipients during 1993 and 1997,
while the sample in North Carolina is for 1997.  The sampling frame is quarters of welfare
receipt, so individuals appear once for each quarter during each year in which they received
welfare.  This approach assures that the measures are representative of the average caseload
during the year.6
Among the standard demographic measures, race shows the greatest differences over time
and between states.  The proportion of nonwhite welfare recipients is nearly 20 percentage points
higher in North Carolina than in Missouri.  Over the four years covered by our data in Missouri,
the proportion nonwhite grows by 4 percentage points.  More of the Missouri recipients are high
school dropouts than are recipients in North Carolina.  Missouri welfare recipients are slightly
older, have more children, and their children are older in 1997, but these differences are small.
7 The observed difference is due to the category breaks in conjunction with the fact that
there are more moderately large metropolitan centers in North Carolina.  According to 2000
Census statistics, two of the metropolitan areas classified as “small” in North Carolina have total
populations greater than 1 million (Greensboro–Winston-Salem–High Point and
Raleigh–Durham–Chapel Hill).  In contrast, none of the metropolitan areas classified as small in
Missouri has a population over 400,000.  Our classification is based on the system developed by
the United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service.
8 Our wage record data allow us identify the earnings that an individual receives from
each employer in a quarter.  However, for individuals with earnings from multiple employers, we
do not know whether employment was simultaneous or sequential.  Recipients are classified as
not having a job if they do not appear in the earnings data.
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Among the most important differences between states is the settlement density.  Over 50
percent of Missouri’s welfare recipients live in the central counties of large metropolitan areas
(St. Louis and Kansas City), whereas in North Carlina, less than 15 percent live in Charlotte, the
state’s only large metropolitan area.  Approximately half of North Carolina’s caseload is in small
metropolitan areas, in contrast to less than 10 percent for Missouri.7  Reflecting settlement
patterns in the south, North Carolina has a larger proportion living outside any metropolitan
area—nearly 40 percent, in contrast to approximately 25 percent in Missouri.
IV.  Employment, Earnings, and Welfare Exit of Welfare Recipients
Characteristics of Welfare Recipients by Job Sector
We begin our analysis of the effect that temporary help services firms have on the labor
market experience of welfare workers by looking at how the characteristics of welfare recipients
vary by job sector.  Throughout this analysis we divide workers into three main groups based on
their employment during a quarter: (1) those with no job, (2) those with jobs in only one of our
sectors, and (3) those with jobs in multiple sectors.8  We further divide the second group by
9 This division is based on the SIC code of the employer.  The temporary help sector is
SIC code 7363.  Manufacturing includes SIC codes 20-39, retail trade includes SIC codes 52-59,
and services includes SIC codes 70-89.  Workers in all other industries are included in the
“other” category.  
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sector: temporary help, manufacturing, retail trade, services (not temporary help), and any other
industry.9  Finally, we divide workers with jobs in more than one sector into those who have at
least one job in the temporary help sector, and those who do not have a job in the temporary help
sector.  In Table 2, we present the characteristics of Missouri and North Carolina welfare
recipients separately by type of job.
Comparing recipients with no job to those with a job in the temporary help sector only,
we see that welfare recipients who do not have a job are less educated, are more likely to be
white, have longer spells on welfare, and work a smaller percentage of time in the previous eight
quarters.  These differences are similar for welfare recipients in both Missouri and North
Carolina.
Comparing welfare recipients with jobs in temporary help with other employed welfare
recipients, we see that recipients working in temporary help are much more likely to be nonwhite. 
In addition, temporary help workers have slightly longer spells on welfare and work a smaller
percentage of time in the previous eight quarters.   However, with the exception of race, the
differences in characteristics between recipients working in temporary help jobs and recipients
working in other sectors are much smaller than the differences in characteristics between those
with jobs and those without.
Earnings of Welfare Recipients by Job Type
12
Table 3 presents the mean earnings of welfare recipients by type of employment.  Since
workers with no job have zero earnings by definition, we have excluded them from this table. 
Comparing the earnings of welfare recipients working in temporary help jobs with recipients
working in other industries, we see that the mean earnings of workers in temporary help jobs is
substantially below the mean earnings of workers in other sectors.  In Missouri in 1997, welfare
recipients working in the temporary help sector average 40 percent lower earnings than workers
in manufacturing, while in North Carolina workers in the temporary help sector have average
earnings that are one-third lower than workers in manufacturing.  While the differences tend to
be smaller when comparing the average earnings of temporary help workers with the average
earnings of workers in other industries, the difference is always at least $100, which translates
into at least 10 percent lower average earnings for welfare recipients working in the temporary
help sector.  
One other interesting comparison in Table 3 is between recipients who hold jobs in
multiple sectors, one of which is in the temporary help sector, and recipients who hold jobs in
multiple sectors but none in the temporary help sector.  Although those with jobs in temporary
help have lower earnings, the difference is generally less than 10 percent.  One hypothesis that
might account for this pattern is that those with both types of jobs may take a job in the
temporary help sector because the flexibility of a temporary help job may lower the costs of
having more than one job.  In contrast, recipients with just one job in the temporary help industry
may have lower skills and may therefore take a job in the temporary help industry because
temporary jobs better match their skills.
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Table 4 presents employment and earnings information over the next two years for
welfare recipients separately by type of current job.  In both Missouri and North Carolina, we see
that recipients with no current job have substantially lower earnings over the next two years than
any class of workers and have fewer quarters in which they have positive earnings.  We also see
that, relative to recipients working in other sectors, recipients with a job only in the temporary
help sector tend to have lower earnings over the next two years.  However, it is important to note
that the difference in the sum of earnings between workers in the temporary help sector and
workers in other sectors is much smaller than the difference in current earnings reported in Table
3.  The average sum of earnings over the next two years for welfare recipients in Missouri in
1997 whose job is in the temporary help sector is 14 percent less than welfare recipients whose
job is in manufacturing.  In contrast, we saw in Table 3 that the average current earnings of
recipients in the temporary help sector was 40 percent lower than average current earnings of
recipients working in manufacturing.  This implies that recipients working in the temporary help
sector have considerably higher rates of earnings growth over the next two years than recipients
in the manufacturing sector.  We see a similar pattern when we compare the earnings of
temporary help workers to the earnings of workers in other industries.  
Equally notable, we see that among individuals who are observed initially to have jobs in
multiple sectors, those with a temporary help job actually have higher earnings than others in the
subsequent two years, in contrast to their current earnings, which are lower.  The finding that
welfare recipients working in the temporary help sector have lower current earnings but faster
earnings growth relative to recipients working in other sectors is consistent with the hypothesis
that the reason workers accept jobs in the temporary help sector is because these jobs allow them
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to demonstrate to employers that they are productive, ultimately leading to more stable, higher-
paying jobs.
Future Welfare Receipt
Table 5 presents statistics on welfare receipt over the subsequent two years, again broken
out by the type of job held (or no job) in the current quarter and year of observation.  In both
Missouri and North Carolina, we see that a larger percentage of recipients with no job are still on
welfare in two years as compared with those holding any job, and recipients with no job receive
welfare payments in more quarters over the next two years.  When we compare recipients with a
job only in temporary help to other employed recipients, we see that recipients working in
temporary help are also more likely to be on welfare in two years and to receive welfare
payments in more quarters over the next two years.  Welfare recipients who have a job only in
the temporary help sector are less likely to leave welfare than recipients who have a job in
another sector or who have jobs in multiple sectors.  However, relative to welfare recipients with
no job, recipients working in the temporary help industry are less likely to be on welfare two
years later and receive fewer quarters of welfare over the period.  Finally looking at the data for
Missouri we see that for all industry groups, the percent on welfare two years later is lower for
the more recent cohorts.  
In summary, Tables 2-5 suggest that recipients with any job, including those with jobs in
temporary help services, tend to be more skilled, have been on welfare for less time, and are
more likely to move off of welfare in the future than those with no jobs.  However, relative to
recipients working in other sectors, recipients with jobs only in the temporary help sector tend to
be less skilled, are less likely to leave welfare, have lower current earnings, but experience faster
10Previous studies indicate that controls for labor market experience and prior earnings
are particularly important, as they correlate strongly with unobserved characteristics related to
future employment and earnings (Houseman and Polivka, 1999; Segal and Sullivan, 1997b;
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998).
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growth in earnings in the next two years.  These findings are all consistent with the hypothesis
that welfare recipients obtain opportunities for future advancement by working in the temporary
help sector.  Of course, up to this point, we have not controlled for other characteristics of
workers that might affect their earnings and employment and welfare patterns in our analysis.  It
is this more in-depth analysis that we turn to next.
V. Determinants of Employment, Earnings and Welfare Receipt
Determinants of Job Type  
We begin by examining the relationship between welfare recipient characteristics and the
type of job.  We estimate a multinomial logit model, where the types of jobs an individual can
have are: no job; a job in the temporary help sector only (“Job in Temp Help”); a job both in the
temporary help sector and in another industry (“Job in Temp Help and Other Industry”); a job in
another industry but no job in the temporary help sector (“Job, but None in Temp Help”).  No job
is the excluded category in this analysis, so all of the effects are relative to not having a job.  
We estimate the multinomial logit model controlling for the set of demographic
characteristics discussed previously (age, education, nonwhite, number of children and age of the
youngest child) as well as measures of past welfare experience, labor market experience, and
prior earnings.10  We also control for the quarter of the year from which the observation comes
11We examine the impact of age at the sample mean, based on the coefficients for the
linear and squared terms.
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and a variety of characteristics of the county where an individual lives.  In addition to the
county’s metropolitan status, we control for the county’s sanction rate and welfare departure rate. 
County-specific measures of the economy include the county’s employment level, the share of
employment in nine primary industries and the average earnings in each.
The results from our multinomial logit analysis are presented in Table 6.  Looking at the
coefficients in this table, we see that, with a few notable exceptions, the effects of individual
characteristics are very similar across the three types of jobs, relative to not having a job. 
Perhaps the most striking exception, however, is the large difference in probabilities by race
across job types.  The probability that a welfare recipient has a job in the temporary help sector is
substantially higher for nonwhites than for whites, while there is relatively little difference by
race in the likelihood of obtaining other jobs.  In addition, contrary to our expectations, older
workers are relatively more likely to have jobs in the temporary help sector than jobs in another
industry, although this effect is smaller in the most recent period.11
As expected, there are important differences by geographical location.  Here we see that
living in a metropolitan area significantly increases the probability that a recipient has any type of
temporary help job relative to not having a job or to having a job in another industry.  (This
relationship is somewhat more pronounced in Missouri than in North Carolina.)  This effect is in
addition to the strong impacts of measures reflecting the local economy.  As might be expected,
greater levels of overall employment in the county imply a greater chance of temporary
employment—especially where temporary employment is combined with other kinds of
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employment.  We see that high levels of construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade and resale
trade employment increase the likelihood of a temporary help job.  Earnings by industry also
have statistically significant impacts, although effects are difficult to summarize.  As might be
expected, higher earnings in the industries listed above do not generally increase the likelihood of
a temporary help job, suggesting that it is the lower-paying firms in these industries that are most
likely to hire temporary help workers. 
It is worthwhile to note that these results fail to support the view that women with more
demanding family responsibilities are more likely to take temporary help jobs.  It appears that
individuals with more children or with younger children are no more likely to be in temporary
help jobs than other jobs.
Determinants of Earnings
The analyses above (Tables 3 and 4) show that those with jobs in temporary help service
firms have initial earnings that are appreciably below those with jobs in most other major
industry categories but that the difference in earnings between these groups declines in the
following eight quarters.  Several problems arise in attempting to identify whether this
relationship is causal.  The first problem is that individuals who take temporary help jobs may
have different measured characteristics than other workers, and this difference may partly explain
their lower earnings.  Of course, we can control for these differences in a regression. 
The more serious problem is that individuals in temporary help jobs may differ in
unobserved ways from workers in others industries.  Insofar as individuals have choices among
alternative kinds of jobs, the conscious choice of a temporary help job may select individuals
whose opportunities in other jobs are different from observationally identical individuals in those
12 This method uses probabilities obtained in the multinomial logit selection model to
construct an inverse Mills ratio that is entered as a control variable (“Lambda” in our tables). 
The standard errors in these regressions are corrected to account for estimation error in the
inverse Mills ratio.  See Gyourko and Tracy (1988) for an explication of the method.  
13 The likelihood ratio tests for these measures taken together indicate that in all of our
analyses they have a highly significant impact on job choice.
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jobs.  In addition, since job type is partly determined by an employer decision, employer
selection on unmeasured characteristics overlays self-selection.  Although almost any selection
configuration is possible, we suspect that women who have particular difficulty obtaining other
employment may obtain temporary help positions, which implies that their low earnings are
partly due to unmeasured characteristics.
To address these problems, we fit earnings models separately for our four classes of
workers controlling both for individual characteristics and for unmeasured factors that influence
selection into the job using the selection correction method proposed by Lee (1982).12  In order to
identify the selection model we assume that our measures of county employment, county sanction
and welfare departure rate, industrial structure and industry-specific earnings enter into the
selection equation but not into the equation predicting earnings.13  In essence, this implies that
these county measures of the economy and welfare policy influence individual earnings
exclusively through current employment and observed job type.  While this assumption may be
violated, these measures have the advantage that they will be largely independent of unmeasured
individual characteristics that undoubtedly influence job choice and earnings.  They therefore
avoid the problems due to self-selection into jobs based on individual-specific earnings
opportunities, which we expect to impose the most severe biases on results.
14 Lane et al. (forthcoming) use a matching technique to compare temporary help workers
to others, which if successful, allows for variation in impact by job choice.  However, they report
that, in practice, their methods did not match very well on work history measures.  Matching
assumes unmeasured factors do not bias estimates.
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We chose the above approach rather than a simple instrumental variables model because
it is more flexible and allows us to directly incorporate elements of the selection process into the
estimation.  Individual characteristics are permitted to have differing impacts on ultimate
earnings depending on current industry of employment and on whether the individual is
employed.  In our empirical analyses, the most dramatic differences are between those who are
employed and others, and we see below that the impact of taking a temporary help job is
substantially different for the kinds of people we observe without a job and those who have a job. 
The method also uses an explicit selection model to correct estimates of impact, allowing the
functional form derived from the selection process to contribute to identification of the model.14
Appendix Table A-1 presents equations that predict current earnings for individuals
holding jobs in the three classes identified by the multinomial logit: (1) job only in temporary
help, (2) job in temporary help and another industry, (3) one or more jobs, but no job in
temporary help.  Since individuals without jobs have no earnings by definition, they are omitted
in this analysis.  Results are quite conventional, although, as might be expected in an analysis
that controls for type of employment, estimated coefficients are frequently not statistically
significant.  Perhaps of greatest interest is that the coefficient on Lambda is not statistically
significant in any of the regression equations, suggesting that selection effects are not of import
in this case.
15 We also estimated similar measures for those in the other two categories of jobs. 
Although some differences exist, the pattern of effects are similar, and none of our conclusions
would be altered by considering these estimates.
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Appendix Tables A-2 and A-3 present results for selection-corrected models predicting
the sum of total inflation-adjusted earnings over the eight quarters subsequent to the reference
quarter, as well as earnings in just the eighth quarter.  Since individuals with no jobs during the
reference quarter may obtain jobs in the following quarters, we include those with no job as an
employment class.   In all samples, the coefficient on Lambda is statistically significant for those
not working during the reference quarter, but it is not significant for the other classes.  
Table 7 presents statistics addressing the issue of how job category influences current and
subsequent earnings based on these models.  Panel A in the table presents estimates of impact on
earnings in the current quarter, panel B presents estimates of impact on the sum of earnings over
the eight subsequent quarters, and panel C presents estimates of impact on earnings in the eighth
quarter.  In each case the comparison is between a job in the temporary help industry only and the
other three categories of job.  Thus, each entry in the table is an estimated difference in earnings
due to having a job in the temporary help industry only versus no job (or another job or some
combination of jobs).
The simple difference between earnings for those in the given categories is shown in line
1.  Line 2 presents impact estimates for an individual whose characteristics are at the mean of
those who have no job.  As such, it addresses the policy question of how those with no job would
fare if they obtained jobs.  Line 3 shows the impact estimated at the mean values for individuals
in temporary help service jobs.  If we view a temporary help job as the treatment, these estimates
are the impact of the treatment on the treated.15  In lines 2 and 3, estimates of impact are obtained
16 In general, the most accurately estimated predictions are those where dependent
variables are closest to the means on which the sample is estimated.  Since the group means on
the independent variables that are used in estimating lines 2-3 are only slightly displaced from
those used to estimate parameters, estimated standard errors are not inflated by this procedure.
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including Lambda in the estimate (evaluated at the mean for the relevant group), so the estimate
is conditional on having made the choice, in effect allowing for unmeasured differences that
influence job choice to also impact earnings.  It answers the question of what the earnings would
be of an individual whose measured characteristics corresponded to this group but who chose one
job class or another.  If self-selection plays any role, these impact estimates may, in part, reflect
unmeasured factors that cause individuals to make different job choices.
In contrast, although lines 4 and 5 are also estimated at the means of group
characteristics, the coefficient for Lambda is set to zero.  This simulates the experiment of
actually taking an individual and placing her into one job category rather than another, as
opposed to identifying an individual who makes the choice.  Standard errors for these estimates
are generally much greater than for comparable estimates in lines 2 and 3.  In setting Lambda=0,
we predict earnings based on independent variable values far from the means for the samples on
which coefficient estimates were obtained.  Since the coefficient of Lambda is estimated with
much error, this causes the predicted earnings based on these equations to contain substantial
error.16
Comparing the simple differences for current earnings with estimates of impacts reported
in lines 2 and 3 in panel A, we see that measured individual characteristics explain only a modest
proportion of observed earnings differences between job classes.  Estimates of the impact of
having a temporary job for an individual who, in fact, has no job (line 2) range from $629 to
22
$846.  However, the second and third columns indicate that for such an individual, earnings in a
temporary help job are lower by between $200 and $400 than they would be in another job, and
lower by about $500 than earnings for holding both a temporary help and another job.  Line 3
shows that impact estimates are generally larger if we focus on those in temporary help jobs. 
Lines 4 and 5 show similar patterns, although standard errors are so large that comparisons are
often not meaningful.
Looking at panel B, we see that individual characteristics become more important when
we focus on the sum of earnings over the subsequent eight quarters.  Comparing the simple
difference in earnings (line 1) with estimates of impact in lines 2 and 3, we see that the gap in the
earnings between those who had no job and those who had a temporary job (column 1) is around
$6000, but the estimated impact is as little as $4200.   Estimates reported in columns 4 and 5
display similar patterns.
Perhaps of greatest interest, we see that the dollar decrement to having a temporary help
job rather than a job in another industry ranges from about $500 to $1600, which is generally less
than a third of the positive impact of a temporary job relative to no job.  Impact estimates for
current earnings in panel A implied a much larger relative penalty for temporary help
employment.  In percentage terms, we find that, controlling for observable characteristics,
temporary help employees have current earnings that are about 60 percent of earnings for those
in other jobs, but the sum of their subsequent earnings is at least 85 percent of that for other
workers.  This underscores our observation that the low earnings obtained in temporary help jobs
do not appear to be permanent. 
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Lines 4 and 5 do not provide much evidence that selection on the basis of unmeasured
factors into each job category explains the gap between predicted earnings for temporary help
workers and those with no job.  In North Carolina, this impact measure is actually larger than
those reported in lines 1 and 2 and is statistically significant, whereas in the two Missouri
samples, estimates are very imprecise.   
  Panel C, which presents impact estimates based on earnings in the eighth quarter after the
reference quarter, underscores the basic pattern reported in panel B.  Earnings for those initially
in temporary help jobs are predicted to be at least 94 percent of the earnings they would obtain if
they had been in an alternative job.  Impact estimates (second column) are generally substantively
small and often are not statistically significant.  Overall, we conclude that, although temporary
help workers earn lower wages initially, they also have faster subsequent wage growth, so that by
eight quarters later, workers who initially held temporary help jobs have earnings that are close to
those of workers who had jobs in other industries.
Estimates of the impact on ultimate earnings of holding a temporary job rather than no
job, as reported in both panels B and C, are substantial both for individuals who don’t have jobs
(line 1) and for those who have such jobs (line 2), although there generally somewhat higher for
the former.  It appears that a policy of moving individuals who would not otherwise be employed
into temporary help jobs has substantial beneficial effects, whether one is examining current
temporary help workers or those who might be subject to future policy.
Perhaps most surprising is the fact that the role of temporary help has changed relatively
little in Missouri over the period we observe it.  Between 1993 and 1997, the proportion of
welfare recipients with any kind of temporary help job more than doubled, and among employed
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welfare recipients, the proportion increased by 50 percent.  This period also corresponds with
changes in the welfare system, in which there was growing pressure for recipients to seek
employment, accompanied by dramatic declines in the welfare caseload.  If recipients were being
forced into temporary help jobs in this period, we might expect that the those employed in these
jobs would fare worse than in earlier years, in contrast to our findings.
Mobility Between Jobs
Of course, we expect that one of the primary ways that those in temporary help jobs
improve their position is by moving into jobs in other industries.  Table 8 provides some
indication of the job mobility of temporary help workers and others.  For ease of presentation, an
employed individual is classified by the job from which she received the most earnings in the
quarter.  We recognize that many of the temporary help workers that “move” to other industries
were actually working in firms in those industries while they were employed by temporary help
firms.  However, for those workers, such a move nonetheless identifies an important change in
employment status.  
Each row in Table 8 indicates how individuals in a given type of job are distributed
across jobs a year later.  We see, for example, that in 1993, 38.6 percent of temporary help
workers were working in service jobs (including temporary help) one year later.  The patterns are
quite similar across years and states, and in each case they indicate that mobility from temporary
help positions to other industries is substantial.  Whereas over 50 percent of workers in service
industries (not temporary help) remain in service, only about 40 percent of temporary help
workers are still in service one year later.  In our two states, the proportion of temporary help
workers who have moved to manufacturing, although modest, is greater than for any of the other
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industries, aside from manufacturing itself.  Temporary help workers are also relatively likely to
move into the “other” category.  The likelihood of movement to these two industry categories is
significant given that jobs in these industries on average pay higher wages (see Table 3).  
While the movements are not striking, they nonetheless give some indication of the kind
of mobility that temporary help workers may be experiencing.  Furthermore, it is worthwhile to
note that the proportion of workers who do not have a job one year later is also similar across
industries, suggesting that temporary workers are not significantly more likely to be without a job
a year later than those who go to work in other industries.
Movement Off of Welfare
Next we estimate the probability that an individual is on welfare eight quarters later, 
controlling for measured characteristics and unmeasured factors that influence selection into the
job.  We again apply Lee’s (1982) selection correction method to this linear probability model. 
We use the same classification system for job type that we used in the earning models, (i.e., no
job, job in temporary help only, job in temporary help and another industry, or job but none in
temporary help), and similarly construct the inverse Mills ratio using probabilities obtained in the
multinomial logit selection model.  Appendix Table A-4 presents results for the selection-
corrected models predicting the probability of leaving welfare eight quarters later, with the
standard errors adjusted for estimation error in the inverse Mills ratio. 
Appendix Table A-4 shows that the estimated impacts of individual characteristics are
consistent with prior research, and differences over time and between states are small.  The
coefficients on Lambda in all of the Missouri models are generally not statistically significant,
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implying that selection effects are negligible.  The North Carolina results suggest, however, that
self-selection is particularly important for those with no job during the reference quarter.  
Table 9 presents statistics that indicate how the type of job one enters influences the
probability of leaving welfare.  Differences in the observed probabilities are shown in line 1;
lines 2 and 3 show estimated impacts for individuals who initially hold no job and those who
hold a temporary help job only.  Following the same structure as Table 7, lines 2 and 3 include
Lambda, and therefore do not correct for selection on unmeasured factors, whereas lines 4 and 5
set Lambda to zero, removing any differences due to selection on unmeasured characteristics.
The results show that welfare recipients holding jobs are substantially more likely to be
off of welfare in two years than are those without jobs, but there is a decline in this impact over
time.  Focusing on Missouri, where we can compare periods prior to and following welfare
reform, line 2 shows that, in 1993, the chance of leaving welfare is 6.6 percentage points higher
for a recipient with a job (not in temporary help) than for a recipient with no job, whereas in
1997 the difference is only 2.9 percentage points.  The difference in North Carolina in 1997 is 3.4
percentage points.  Recall that the chance that any individual leaves welfare increases
dramatically between 1993 and 1997 (Table 5), and the observed pattern is consistent with the
view that welfare reform has had its greatest impact on those without jobs. 
In North Carolina, those with only temporary help jobs have a chance of leaving welfare
that is 3.8 percentage point lower than those in other jobs.  The difference is greater in Missouri,
with a difference of nearly 7.7 percentage points in 1993 and over 10 percentage points in 1997. 
However, when we control for measured personal characteristics (lines 2 and 3), the impact
estimates are smaller, less than half as great in some cases, implying that much of the lower
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chance of leaving welfare for temporary help workers is due to measured characteristics.  In
1997, in both Missouri and North Carolina, once we control for observable characteristics,
recipients working in temporary help jobs are about 3 percentage points less likely to leave
welfare in two years than recipients working in other industries.  Hence, once measured factors
are controlled, working in a temporary help job has only a small impact on the chance of exiting
welfare.
Controlling for unmeasured differences that influence selection into jobs (lines 4 and 5)
has no consistent effect on the estimated impacts of temporary employment on the chance of
leaving welfare.  As in the earnings models, these estimates have large standard errors and are
not very informative about the importance of selection in biasing estimates of the impact of
temporary versus other jobs.  However, lines 3 and 4 tend to confirm the positive impact of
having a temporary help job rather than no job.  In fact, in North Carolina, these are statistically
significant and the point estimates imply that a large impact of employment on welfare exit is
partly hidden by unmeasured factors.
VI. Summary and Conclusion
Our results confirm the view that welfare recipients in temporary help jobs receive lower
earnings and have less promising prospects for movement from welfare than those who have jobs
in other industries.  However, what is perhaps of greatest interest is that these differences are
small once we control for individual characteristics.  Earnings in subsequent years for temporary
help workers increase faster than those in other industries.  Overall, it is clear that those in
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temporary help jobs have appreciably better future prospects than those who are not holding jobs,
even after controlling for all of the characteristics that we can observe.
Whether temporary help jobs are, on net, beneficial to welfare recipients depends on
whether they supplant jobs that provide better pay and benefits and greater levels of stability.  It
seems likely that a welfare recipient with a job in a manufacturing firm faces at least slightly
better prospects than a worker in temporary help services.  But we suspect that for many welfare
recipients, attractive jobs are not available because their skills and observable characteristics
make employers unwilling to hire them into the stable and high-paying jobs, such as those in
manufacturing.  If temporary help jobs provide employment for at least some welfare recipients
who would not otherwise have employment, these analyses show that the impact will be strongly
positive.
Even if temporary help jobs supplant other jobs, there is very little evidence to suggest
that workers in those positions are significantly hurt in the long run.  Our analyses suggest that 
temporary help jobs provide a path to other industries with higher pay and greater stability. 
There is also evidence that some recipients benefit from being able to combine work in
temporary help services with other employment.  Undoubtedly, some of those with temporary
help jobs find themselves trapped in employment with low earnings and perennial instability, but
we do not find evidence that, among welfare recipients, such problems are worse for temporary
help workers than for those in most other jobs.  Those who take temporary positions are not more
likely than those taking jobs in other industries to be without a job a year later.  And despite the
growth in the number of recipients with temporary help jobs, there is no indication that the
circumstances of these workers have deteriorated over time.
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics of Welfare Recipients
North Carolina
1993 1997 1997
Age 29.11 29.37 28.95
(7.51) (7.66) (7.66)
Age squared 903.77 921.06 896.90
(492.43) (503.38) (501.19)
Percent with education lower than 12 years 44.8 45.7 37.8
Percent nonwhite 46.9 51.0 69.1
Number of children 2.05 2.07 1.82
(1.18) (1.21) (1.01)
Age of the youngest child 4.89 5.04 4.93
(4.47) (4.41) (4.30)
Percent on welfare less than 6 months in prior 2 years 21.6 20.2 24.6
Percent on welfare 7-12 months in prior 2 years 12.9 12.9 15.1
Percent on welfare 13-23 months in prior 2 years 28.6 32.4 33.3
Percent on welfare 24 months in prior 2 years 37.0 34.6 27.0
Percent of previous 8 quarters working 27.45 37.71 43.39
(31.40) (34.00) (35.16)
Percent working all of previous 8 qtrs 4.9 8.1 11.3
Percent not work in any of previous 8qtrs 40.8 28.1 23.1
Total annual earnings in the prior year 1397 2074 2549
(2916) (3463) (3764)
Total annual earnings two years prior 1785 2252 2735
(3655) (3916) (4321)
Percent in St. Louis County and St. Louis City 36.4 39.1 n.a.
Percent in Kansas City central area (Jackson County) 16.7 17.5 n.a.
Percent in Charlotte central (Mecklenburg County)* n.a. n.a. 11.3
Percent in suburban areas* 9.7 8.4 3.5
Percent in small metropolitan areas 9.5 9.0 46.9
Percent outside metropolitan areas 27.8 26.0 38.4
Quarter 1 24.8 27.3 26.5
Quarter 2 24.8 25.3 25.5
Quarter 3 25.2 24.3 24.8
Quarter 4 25.3 23.2 23.2
Number of observation 289,160 219,442 293,276
Missouri
Note: Standard deviations of continuous variables are in parentheses.  Sample includes females aged at least 18 and less than 65 in 
single parent families, not in child only cases.  Sampling frame is quarter by welfare recipient.  Earnings are adjusted for inflation to 
real dollars for the fourth quarter of 1997.  *Suburban areas include the noncentral counties in the St. Louis, Kansas City, and Charlotte
metropolitan areas.
Table 2: Sample Characteristics of Welfare Recpients by Industry Combinations
No Job
Temp Help Manufacturing Retail Trade Service* Other
Temp Help and 
Any Other 
Any Industry Not 
Temp Help
Variables
1993 29.63 28.28 28.40 26.22 28.78 28.58 27.73 26.81
1997 30.10 28.74 29.65 26.79 29.22 29.08 27.92 27.47
1993 47.5 35.8 43.9 41.7 36.3 30.0 31.4 36.6
1997 48.0 41.9 45.9 47.0 41.3 34.3 39.1 41.9
1993 44.7 74.8 30.9 46.6 56.2 56.5 69.2 45.6
1997 45.0 73.2 34.9 50.8 63.0 63.3 71.9 54.5
1993 2.10 2.02 1.88 1.81 1.97 1.88 1.88 1.78
(1.22) (1.16) (1.00) (1.00) (1.11) (1.06) (1.06) (.96)
1997 2.10 2.07 2.00 1.92 2.08 2.01 2.01 1.93
(1.25) (1.19) (1.11) (1.11) (1.19) (1.15) (1.14) (1.09)
1993 4.99 4.90 5.05 3.88 5.06 4.92 4.95 4.39
(4.53) (4.40) (4.45) (3.91) (4.42) (4.32) (4.40) (4.13)
1997 5.13 5.08 5.33 4.27 5.26 5.15 4.88 4.70
(4.54) (4.33) (4.46) (3.98) (4.33) (4.27) (4.12) (4.02)
1993 16.66 15.89 12.20 13.50 14.47 14.06 14.05 12.70
(8.56) (8.46) (8.99) (8.88) (8.72) (8.72) (8.64) (8.73)
1997 16.60 16.36 13.15 14.85 16.13 15.83 15.23 14.20
(8.49) (8.26) (8.65) (8.62) (8.35) (8.38) (8.30) (8.55)
1993 18.71 44.71 47.14 49.73 50.05 50.15 58.90 57.48
(26.00) (31.06) (33.47) (32.62) (33.17) (33.04) (30.68) (31.56)
1997 25.01 54.54 49.39 53.64 54.47 55.41 67.08 64.22
(28.94) (31.62) (32.88) (32.08) (32.83) (32.98) (29.63) (30.40)
Age (mean) 1997 29.65 27.59 28.69 26.95 29.61 29.58 27.64 27.84
Percent with education 
less than 12 years
1997 41.6 33.8 41.2 36.2 28.8 28.9 31.4 31.9
Percent nonwhite 1997 66.9 81.1 68.7 64.3 77.1 66.6 78.5 68.4
1997 1.85 1.82 1.85 1.73 1.86 1.78 1.79 1.77
(1.04) (.96) (.99) (.94) (1.00) (.96) (.96) (.95)
1997 4.98 4.59 5.06 4.35 5.41 5.35 4.79 4.91
(4.43) (3.94) (4.27) (3.94) (4.31) (4.37) (3.98) (4.11)
1997 15.47 14.26 12.34 13.92 14.73 13.63 13.00 12.88
(8.70) (8.30) (8.58) (8.49) (8.40) (8.68) (8.22) (8.42)
1997 28.01 57.07 60.12 58.24 59.52 57.34 70.52 68.47
(30.49) (31.31) (32.77) (31.68) (32.48) (32.84) (28.89) (29.75)
Panel B. North Carolina
Number of months on 
welfare in previous 2 
years
Percent of previous 8 
quarters employed
Note: Standard deviations of continuous variables are in parentheses. Sample includes females aged at least 18 and less than 65 in single parent families, not in child 
only cases.  Sampling frame is quarter by welfare recipient.   *Service excludes temporary help.
Number of children 
Age of youngest child 
under 18
One Industrial Sector Multiple Sectors
Age (mean)
Panel A. Missouri
Percent with education 
less than 12 years
Percent nonwhite
Percent of previous 8 
quarters employed
Age of youngest child 
under 18
Number of children 
Number of months on 
welfare in previous 2 
years
Industry Combinations Percent Earnings Percent Earnings Percent Earnings
One sector:
Temp help 7.8 656 11.0 940 10.2 1035
(770) (1078) (1079)
Manufacturing 6.9 1245 4.9 1565 9.5 1604
(1276) (1743) (1365)
Retail 29.1 891 25.3 1090 30.1 1128
(824) (1039) (927)
Service* 35.7 1107 34.1 1461 26.6 1413
(1057) (1346) (1207)
Other 7.9 1457 7.8 1973 5.1 1682
(1385) (1793) (1583)
Mulitiple sectors:
Temp help and any other industry 4.7 1269 8.3 1535 8.6 1528
(1038) (1299) (1159)
No jobs in temp help industry 8.0 1344 8.6 1615 9.9 1652
(1114) (1460) (1386)
Table 3: Distribution of Jobs and Quarterly Earnings by Industry Combinations
1997
North Carolina
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Sample includes females aged at least 18 and less than 65 in single parent families, not in 
child only cases.  Sampling frame is quarter by welfare recipient.  *Service excludes temporary help.
Missouri
1993 1997
Industry Combinations
Sum of 
Earnings 
Number quarters with 
Nonzero Earnings
Sum of 
Earnings 
Number quarters with 
Nonzero Earnings
Sum of 
Earnings 
Number quarters 
with Nonzero 
Earnings
No job 3450 2.1 5180 2.9 7605 3.1
(6258) (2.5) (7600) (2.7) (8154) (2.8)
One sector:
Temp help 9380 5.0 11600 5.5 12549 5.7
(9805) (2.6) (10980) (2.4) (10695) (2.4)
Manufacturing 11846 4.9 13391 5.3 14444 5.8
(12467) (2.7) (13016) (2.6) (11421) (2.4)
Retail 9332 5.2 10705 5.5 11329 5.8
(8895) (2.6) (9501) (2.5) (8879) (2.4)
Service* 11567 5.4 13798 5.8 14218 6.0
(11173) (2.6) (11712) (2.4) (11024) (2.4)
Other 13752 5.4 16810 5.9 15542 5.7
(12378) (2.6) (13831) (2.4) (13106) (2.5)
Mulitiple sectors:
Temp help and any other industry 13365 6.1 14779 6.3 15085 6.4
(11391) (2.3) (11874) (2.1) (11296) (2.0)
12510 5.9 13981 6.2 14569 6.4
(10488) (2.3) (11436) (2.1) (11093) (2.1)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Sample includes females aged at least 18 and less than 65 in single parent families, not in child only cases.  
Sampling frame is quarter by welfare recipient.  *Service excludes temporary help.
Table 4: Earnings and Employment Over the Next Two Years by Industry Combinations
North Carolina
19971993 1997
Missouri
No jobs in Temp help industry
Industry Combinations
Percent on
welfare in 2 
years
Number of 
quarters on 
welfare next 2 
years
Number of 
obs.
Percent on
welfare in 2 
years
Number of 
quarters on 
welfare next 2 
years
Number of 
obs.
Percent on
welfare in 2 
years
Number of 
quarters on 
welfare next 
2 years
Number of 
obs.
No job 63.9 6.19 209,325     43.6 5.03 129,440     29.3 4.32      155,206 
(2.54) (2.81) (2.71)
One sector:
Temp help 57.3 5.65 6,230         40.6 4.51 9,921 26.3 3.67        14,088 
(2.75) (2.89) (2.71)
Manufacturing 41.5 4.19 5,500         24.7 3.11 4,409         21.4 2.98        13,112 
(3.02) (2.77) (2.63)
Retail 51.0 5.03 23,222       36.7 4.03 22,752       24.3 3.45        41,623 
(2.93) (2.93) (2.66)
Service* 47.1 4.75 28,503       32.7 3.76 30,710       21.6 3.16        36,706 
(3.00) (2.90) (2.64)
Other 43.6 4.41 6,290         28.8 3.45 6,993         20.5 2.98          7,073 
(3.04) (2.87) (2.70)
Mulitiple sectors:
48.7 4.92 3,744         35.4 4.03 7,485         23.8 3.30        14,088 
(2.94) (2.82) (2.64)
43.4 4.46 6,346         31.0 3.54 7,732         22.5 3.10        13,668 
(2.95) (2.83) (2.63)
No jobs in Temp help 
industry
Temp help and any 
other industry
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Sample includes females aged at least 18 and less than 65 in single parent families, not in child only cases.  Sampling 
frame is quarter by welfare recipient.  *Service excludes temporary help.
Table 5: Welfare Recipiency Over The Next Two Years by Industry Combinations
1997
North CarolinaMissouri
1993 1997
Table 6: Multinomial Logit Estimation of Occupation Choice
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
None in 
Temp Help
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
None in 
Temp Help
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
None in 
Temp Help
Constant -11.984 -11.862 -2.484 -7.510 -9.204 -1.813 -6.144 -7.454 -1.572
(0.935) (1.037) (0.216) (0.544) (0.587) (0.204) (0.396) (0.468) (0.183)
Age 0.129 0.037 -0.026 0.102 0.070 -0.005 0.075 0.052 0.014
(0.021) (0.025) (0.007) (0.014) (0.018) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016) (0.006)
Age square *100 -0.236 -0.129 -0.004 -0.175 -0.155 -0.027 -0.162 -0.129 0.000
(0.033) (0.039) (0.010) (0.022) (0.028) (0.010) (0.023) (0.025) (0.000)
-0.220 -0.306 -0.129 -0.142 -0.205 -0.116 -0.166 -0.202 -0.143
(0.036) (0.044) (0.013) (0.028) (0.031) (0.013) (0.026) (0.027) (0.013)
Nonwhite 0.912 0.714 0.167 0.825 0.739 0.170 0.695 0.532 0.026
(0.048) (0.056) (0.017) (0.038) (0.042) (0.018) (0.032) (0.033) (0.014)
Number of children 0.003 0.002 -0.013 -0.007 0.028 0.017 0.008 0.012 0.023
(0.017) (0.021) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.006) (0.013) (0.014) (0.007)
Age of the youngest child 0.037 0.061 0.022 0.020 0.027 0.021 0.008 0.016 0.014
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
0.044 0.167 0.110 0.045 0.105 0.115 0.052 0.127 0.040
(0.050) (0.058) (0.019) (0.042) (0.046) (0.020) (0.037) (0.038) (0.019)
0.037 0.139 0.102 0.067 0.142 0.114 0.062 0.074 0.012
(0.047) (0.056) (0.018) (0.039) (0.042) (0.018) (0.033) (0.037) (0.017)
-0.021 -0.028 0.056 0.059 0.011 0.169 0.000 -0.048 0.113
(0.053) (0.067) (0.020) (0.043) (0.049) (0.021) (0.040) (0.045) (0.019)
2.014 2.741 1.870 2.034 2.835 1.600 1.501 2.596 1.732
(0.097) (0.104) (0.038) (0.073) (0.080) (0.037) (0.064) (0.072) (0.035)
0.027 0.159 0.411 0.205 0.371 0.366 0.164 0.401 0.421
(0.078) (0.070) (0.030) (0.052) (0.049) (0.028) (0.044) (0.041) (0.025)
-1.081 -1.329 -1.096 -0.888 -1.146 -0.909 -1.105 -1.301 -1.088
(0.049) (0.086) (0.018) (0.046) (0.076) (0.019) (0.044) (0.078) (0.019)
0.069 0.138 0.164 0.073 0.142 0.162 0.122 0.168 0.164
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
-0.093 -0.097 -0.105 -0.070 -0.099 -0.084 -0.056 -0.084 -0.091
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
St. Louis central 0.791 0.725 -0.240 0.878 -0.115 -0.316 na na na
(0.261) (0.311) (0.067) (0.213) (0.233) (0.081)
Kansas City central 0.642 0.565 -0.306 1.271 0.375 -0.278 na na na
(0.309) (0.350) (0.073) (0.207) (0.227) (0.077)
Charlotte central 0.061 0.437 0.173
(0.086) (0.089) (0.045)
Suburban metro 0.953 1.274 -0.178 0.662 0.421 -0.192 -0.054 0.321 0.219
(0.132) (0.141) (0.035) (0.087) (0.103) (0.035) (0.090) (0.089) (0.041)
Small metro 0.331 0.508 -0.148 0.727 0.618 -0.045 -0.103 -0.017 0.084
(0.140) (0.172) (0.035) (0.097) (0.101) (0.038) (0.042) (0.046) (0.021)
Quarter 2 0.073 0.243 0.249 0.422 0.609 0.216 0.207 0.432 0.154
(0.060) (0.079) (0.018) (0.056) (0.063) (0.022) (0.031) (0.037) (0.014)
Quarter 3 0.271 0.670 0.367 0.548 0.818 0.328 0.391 0.591 0.189
(0.059) (0.075) (0.018) (0.055) (0.060) (0.021) (0.039) (0.044) (0.018)
Quarter 4 0.424 0.876 0.362 0.473 0.792 0.220 0.231 0.356 -0.062
(0.113) (0.137) (0.031) (0.078) (0.084) (0.031) (0.059) (0.069) (0.028)
Sanction rate in county* n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.022 -0.030 -0.001 -0.095 -0.741 0.195
(0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.635) (0.688) (0.302)
0.035 0.054 0.032 0.013 0.012 0.017 0.937 3.823 2.211
(0.013) (0.016) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.357) (0.376) (0.166)
0.181 0.290 0.041 0.014 0.096 -0.005 0.218 0.109 -0.070
(0.074) (0.097) (0.019) (0.051) (0.057) (0.019) (0.045) (0.053) (0.021)
North Carolina
1997
Welfare Departure rate in 
county
Log of total employment in 
county
Working all of previous 8 
qtrs
No work in any of previous 
8 quarters
Total annual earnings in 
the prior year *1000
Total annual earnings two 
years prior * 1000
On welfare 7-12 months in 
prior 2 years
On welfare 13-23 months 
in prior 2 years
On welfare 24 months in 
prior 2 years
Percent of previous 8 
quarters working
Missouri
1993 1997
Education lower than 12 
years
Table 6: Continued
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but none 
in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help
Employment Share by Major Industry Sector (Omitted Industry: Service)
-5.466 -0.846 0.026 -0.284 2.343 -0.045 -7.580 -5.898 -0.010
(3.276) (2.596) (0.477) (1.531) (1.134) (0.409) (0.819) (0.875) (0.345)
1.818 -2.382 -0.104 7.626 7.696 -1.168 -17.743 -25.101 -16.016
(4.447) (4.413) (0.749) (1.674) (1.975) (0.799) (9.952) (11.073) (4.717)
12.443 6.717 1.039 3.873 7.352 -0.260 8.894 8.956 0.868
(1.952) (2.480) (0.554) (1.417) (1.504) (0.539) (1.236) (1.381) (0.597)
3.319 2.689 0.252 1.798 2.411 -0.513 1.854 2.590 0.046
(0.725) (0.848) (0.158) (0.351) (0.392) (0.134) (0.229) (0.259) (0.119)
4.165 3.176 0.128 0.787 1.863 -1.149 -2.645 3.214 -0.139
(1.117) (1.204) (0.294) (0.914) (0.907) (0.348) (1.848) (2.083) (0.903)
5.878 6.209 -0.501 1.231 1.288 -0.960 5.681 7.199 0.720
(1.710) (1.949) (0.433) (1.284) (1.363) (0.476) (1.467) (1.700) (0.723)
2.417 1.844 0.895 2.970 1.556 -0.380 -3.030 -1.095 1.360
(1.366) (1.674) (0.334) (0.763) (0.829) (0.287) (0.610) (0.704) (0.265)
5.238 5.382 2.830 -4.726 2.957 2.103 -10.947 -11.813 -0.351
(3.885) (4.129) (0.852) (2.541) (2.907) (0.872) (2.393) (2.694) (0.900)
Earnings  by Major Industry Sector (x10,000)
-0.220 -0.671 -0.171 -0.425 -0.774 -0.064 -0.792 -0.767 0.258
(0.556) (0.475) (0.073) (0.236) (0.260) (0.079) (0.168) (0.194) (0.079)
-0.013 -0.040 -0.007 0.174 0.092 0.127 -0.151 -0.292 0.001
(0.085) (0.123) (0.011) (0.055) (0.061) (0.025) (0.089) (0.097) (0.046)
-0.034 0.069 -0.168 -0.153 0.074 0.204 0.242 0.294 0.022
(0.484) (0.604) (0.131) (0.301) (0.318) (0.105) (0.206) (0.245) (0.094)
0.289 -1.017 -0.161 0.440 0.363 0.299 -0.088 0.056 0.005
(0.366) (0.474) (0.096) (0.188) (0.214) (0.072) (0.120) (0.132) (0.058)
-0.064 0.147 0.053 0.507 -0.059 0.030 -0.520 -0.780 0.153
(0.394) (0.466) (0.101) (0.216) (0.233) (0.087) (0.159) (0.186) (0.072)
-1.770 -0.628 0.344 -1.127 -0.752 0.092 0.684 0.003 0.017
(0.589) (0.643) (0.122) (0.306) (0.315) (0.101) (0.149) (0.175) (0.071)
0.935 -1.569 -0.437 -0.321 1.544 0.142 -1.089 -0.182 -0.073
(0.904) (1.198) (0.281) (0.714) (0.799) (0.292) (0.491) (0.479) (0.219)
-0.522 -0.434 0.470 0.461 0.281 0.017 -0.359 0.333 -0.112
(0.345) (0.423) (0.107) (0.193) (0.229) (0.076) (0.109) (0.119) (0.053)
2.282 2.718 0.268 0.239 0.486 0.019 0.288 0.492 0.374
(0.730) (0.906) (0.198) (0.466) (0.518) (0.182) (0.319) (0.364) (0.149)
N 289,160 289,160 289,160 219,442     219,442     219,442       250,227 250,227 250,227
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Sample includes females aged at least 18 and less than 65 in single parent families, not in child only 
cases.  Sampling frame is quarter by welfare recipient.  Estimation takes account of the correlation of errors for recipients who appear in the 
data multiple times.    * In 1993, prior to welfare reform, sanctions were very unusual in Missouri.
Missouri North Carolina
1993 1997 1997
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate
Service
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, 
Communication, etc.
Wholesale trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance and 
Real Estate
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, 
Communication, etc.
Wholesale trade
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing
Mining
Group for Which
Impact is Estimated
Temp Help 
Only vs. No 
Job
Temp 
Help Only 
vs. Other
Temp Help 
Only  vs. 
Temp Help 
and Other
Temp 
Help  
Only vs. 
No Job
Temp Help 
Only  vs. 
Other
Temp Help 
Only  vs. 
Temp Help 
and Other
Temp 
Help  
Only vs. 
No Job
Temp 
Help 
Only  vs. 
Other
Temp Help 
Only  vs. 
Temp Help 
and Other
732 -495 -684 945 -480 -598 982 -346 -488
(16) (18) (27) (17) (19) (26) (9) (10) (15)
          Conditional on Job Choice (Lambda=mean for group)
629 -347 -498 725 -396 -538 846 -238 -429
(26) (40) (68) (15) (19) (31) (14) (16) (30)
732 -489 -558 945 -457 -492 982 -299 -402
(16) (18) (30) (17) (19) (25) (11) (13) (17)
          Not Conditional on Job Choice (Lambda=0)
557 -1075 -592 1481 724 -780 844 -319 -190
(991) (3779) (1381) (490) (1325) (757) (252) (313) (344)
673 -1013 -635 1583 443 -664 980 -356 -205
(814) (2736) (1124) (414) (989) (627) (223) (257) (294)
5930 -1749 -3986 6420 -1513 -3179 6171 -863 -2758
(210) (225) (355) (199) (213) (268) (94) (98) (142)
          Conditional on Job Choice (Lambda=mean for group)
4359 -1385 -3386 5140 -937 -2324 5992 542 -4005
(302) (342) (668) (353) (367) (617) (3317) (3318) (4443)
4202 -1595 -2855 4507 -1331 -2278 4249 -501 -1716
(217) (231) (358) (211) (214) (293) (163) (163) (218)
          Not Conditional on Job Choice (Lambda=0)
4699 -5361 8677 -241 -7637 -14150 7473 2195 -1617
(10472) (19237) (16707) (10934) (13151) (13165) (746) (2059) (460)
5823 -4509 6972 1580 -7036 -12105 9189 2155 -3640
(8719) (14469) (13706) (9393) (10774) (11075) (3168) (3270) (3828)
779 -86 -438 732 -120 -345 732 -14 -289
(38) (40) (65) (31) (32) (42) (17) (18) (25)
          Conditional on Job Choice (Lambda=mean for group)
503 -59 -302 514 -66 -132 514 3 -115
(56) (59) (119) (44) (46) (80) (37) (40) (68)
496 -71 -274 446 -102 -176 446 19 -124
(40) (41) (64) (33) (33) (43) (27) (29) (35)
          Not Conditional on Job Choice (Lambda=0)
854 -160 2438 297 -588 -1088 1120 641 -125
(2018) (2523) (3011) (1115) (1349) (1547) (551) (589) (712)
1024 -126 1962 618 -552 -971 1293 506 -122
(1687) (2003) (2480) (962) (1100) (1294) (521) (506) (613)
4. Those with no job
5. Job in temporary help only
C. Quarterly Earnings Eight Quarters Later
1. No adjustment
2. Those with no job
3. Job in temporary help only
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Predicted earnings are based on the regression results reported in Appendix Tables A-1 through A-3.  
4. Those with no job
5. Job in temporary help only
Table 7:  Current and Subsequent Predicted Earnings Contingent on Job Choice and Characteristics
1. No adjustment
1. No adustment
 A. Current Quarterly Earnings
B. Total Earnings in Eight Subsequent Quarters
4. Those with no job
5. Job in temporary help only
3. Job in temporary help only
Missouri
2. Those with no job
3. Job in temporary help only
2. Those with no job
North Carolina
1993 1997 1997
Table 8: Movement of Welfare Recipients Between Industries
Current Employment Panel A.  Missouri
1993
Service (incl. 
Temp Help) Manufacturing Retail Trade Other No job Total 
Temp Help 38.6 5.9 10.8 9.3 35.5 100.0
Service, not temp help 50.3 3.5 9.1 4.5 32.7 100.0
Manufacturing 16.8 32.4 9.7 4.2 36.9 100.0
Retail Trade 17.7 4.0 38.0 4.8 35.5 100.0
Other 18.0 4.1 9.6 38.0 30.4 100.0
No job 13.3 2.8 7.7 2.7 73.4 100.0
1997
Temp help 42.5 5.5 11.9 10.2 29.8 100.0
Service, not temp help 54.7 2.6 9.9 5.2 27.7 100.0
Manufacturing 21.8 29.7 11.5 4.6 32.4 100.0
Retail Trade 22.5 2.9 38.0 5.4 31.3 100.0
Other 23.7 3.0 9.9 38.0 25.4 100.0
No job 19.4 2.9 10.4 3.8 63.6 100.0
1997 Panel B. North Carolina
Temp help 39.5 13.7 13.5 7.5 26.0 100.0
Service, not temp help 58.2 4.1 10.7 4.6 22.4 100.0
Manufacturing 19.4 41.9 10.6 3.9 24.3 100.0
Retail Trade 19.8 5.4 44.0 4.2 26.6 100.0
Other 22.1 5.2 11.4 37.2 24.1 100.0
No job 17.6 5.0 12.3 3.2 62.0 100.0
Note: Industry classification is according to employer paying most earnings in a quarter.
Employment One Year Later
Group for Which 
Impact is Estimated
Temp Help 
Only vs. No 
Job
Temp 
Help Only 
vs. Other
Temp Help 
Only  vs. 
Temp Help 
and Other
Temp 
Help  
Only vs. 
No Job
Temp Help 
Only  vs. 
Other
Temp Help 
Only  vs. 
Temp Help 
and Other
Temp 
Help  
Only vs. 
No Job
Temp 
Help 
Only  vs. 
Other
Temp Help 
Only  vs. 
Temp Help 
and Other
0.066 -0.100 -0.086 0.029 -0.077 -0.053 0.034 -0.038 -0.025
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
          Conditional on Job Choice (Lambda=mean for group)
0.114 -0.023 -0.056 0.084 -0.027 -0.016 0.039 -0.031 -0.047
(0.015) (0.015) (0.026) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.014)
0.074 -0.036 -0.054 0.062 -0.036 -0.032 0.031 -0.015 -0.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
          Not Conditional on Job Choice (Lambda=0)
0.603 0.188 -0.045 0.022 -0.193 -0.114 0.547 0.036 -0.095
(0.357) (0.374) (0.521) (0.159) (0.163) (0.268) (0.123) (0.124) (0.164)
0.507 0.167 -0.040 0.041 -0.167 -0.115 0.697 0.073 -0.046
(0.299) (0.308) (0.430) (0.142) (0.137) (0.223) (0.119) (0.108) (0.141)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  Impact estimates are based on predicted means using  regression results reported in Appendix 
Table A-4.
Dependent Variable: Probability of Leaving Welfare
1. No adjustment
4. Those with no job
5. Job in temporary help only
2. Those with no job
3. Job in temporary help only
1993 1997 1997
Table 9: Probability of Leaving Welfare by the Eighth Quarter Contingent on Job Choice and Characteristics
Missouri North Carolina
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help
Constant -212.08 -955.85 296.35 806.45 1488.74 -205.01 194.24 612.70 474.00
(1389.100) (1150.035) (2518.649) (730.829) (830.088) (977.562) (312.99) (419.91) (176.25)
Age 54.07 118.46 56.60 40.83 39.11 33.75 29.58 25.74 28.07
(21.958) (23.617) (46.844) (17.007) (26.076) (15.009) ( 12.55) (21.76) (6.60)
Age square *100 -71.42 -151.85 -64.44 -47.13 -39.59 -38.96 -31.71 -18.22 -31.14
(36.376) (38.617) (39.059) (26.533) (44.358) (15.448) ( 20.23) (35.38) (9.20)
-129.15 -182.41 -117.98 -164.20 -215.09 -177.02 -150.70 -119.17 -109.87
(39.346) (50.322) (99.494) (26.939) (33.257) (26.680) (21.62) (24.90) (9.83)
Nonwhite -83.02 -102.90 -5.68 -66.10 -166.97 32.60 -26.89 -14.17 -3.59
(121.867) (93.001) (71.534) (69.105) (78.242) (17.158) (37.61) (38.61) (11.69)
Number of children -31.70 -54.76 -21.01 -55.61 -50.55 -28.57 -11.91 -42.60 2.75
(13.233) (24.276) (16.637) (11.781) (16.018) (11.327) (11.80) (14.10) (5.25)
Age of the youngest child -7.78 -16.06 -6.77 -14.98 -11.47 -6.25 -10.31 -20.79 -7.75
(7.008) (9.687) (15.381) (5.147) (7.664) (5.279) (4.00) (5.21) (1.98)
176.73 151.95 222.89 191.84 266.73 302.18 107.79 117.26 190.44
(45.401) (59.585) (103.803) (50.497) (58.931) (35.124) (33.50) (40.34) (19.91)
78.02 207.86 226.97 177.83 257.12 348.89 110.39 95.68 218.30
(42.065) (58.210) (91.814) (39.400) (57.684) (26.472) (31.03) (31.51) (27.78)
102.29 77.67 239.14 232.72 402.36 434.78 189.65 127.98 293.42
(50.577) (73.609) (80.859) (47.095) (61.796) (47.812) (37.98) (41.54) (39.09)
-175.94 -410.67 -747.92 -570.71 -955.31 -561.73 -303.59 -546.20 -655.63
(218.724) (260.728) (1539.021) (140.644) (242.348) (416.377) (74.27) (100.47) (78.74)
35.54 -20.24 -152.89 75.77 -101.18 -66.59 26.31 70.87 39.06
(93.878) (87.171) (174.785) (68.015) (57.168) (27.041) (43.75) (38.70) (21.40)
-124.79 -51.05 39.59 -25.76 15.73 -329.86 -105.41 -295.66 -232.89
(142.559) (178.011) (1166.344) (68.075) (98.881) (409.613) (55.98) (77.69) (82.64)
78.59 103.10 91.26 111.10 104.39 158.87 78.03 80.30 112.53
(12.579) (13.717) (147.976) (12.117) (13.329) (56.249) ( 7.17) (6.00) (13.61)
4.62 13.99 37.55 25.14 49.15 21.66 15.01 22.92 28.13
(11.331) (9.988) (90.822) (6.937) (10.884) (26.388) ( 4.51) (4.78) (7.07)
St. Louis central -78.32 229.82 289.62 61.55 223.00 344.94 na na na
(178.824) (144.932) (119.863) (72.389) (70.569) (17.995)
Kansas City central -83.95 237.81 290.05 -5.35 167.48 405.27 na na na
(186.764) (174.096) (35.571) (82.325) (98.468) (41.181)
Charlotte central n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -5.64 106.45 116.19
(35.41) (50.42) (18.34)
Suburban metro -45.95 55.86 115.71 -45.66 -76.75 129.01 20.00 49.22 40.10
(201.111) (179.181) (106.545) (78.270) (63.904) (46.221) (63.42) (50.96) (25.66)
Small metro -223.01 -9.44 38.22 -131.09 -130.37 54.35 -4.72 16.35 47.20
(132.894) (151.639) (19.017) (56.291) (61.107) (16.343) (22.93) (24.56) (9.17)
Quarter 2 36.92 141.93 46.93 15.78 -3.65 46.04 113.74 107.69 96.29
(32.532) (52.995) (187.248) (28.236) (52.658) (35.956) (21.34) (30.27) (11.08)
Quarter 3 46.37 168.34 22.63 8.38 -13.61 34.28 153.86 110.47 82.96
(52.478) (77.932) (281.910) (34.439) (55.186) (64.788) (24.43) (34.21) (11.95)
Quarter 4 160.97 226.15 173.68 142.18 141.91 197.69 267.69 202.26 232.97
(59.922) (74.127) (278.074) (34.225) (62.336) (64.582) (27.74) (33.90) (10.39)
Lambda 26.92 -7.43 -412.39 -323.09 -379.29 270.13 1.16 94.31 -61.33
(370.317) (315.082) (2311.235) (210.604) (219.524) (919.819) (112.01) (91.38) (147.40)
N 6,230 3,744         69,861       9,921         7,485         72,596 12,148 10,073 95,254
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.  All standard errors have been adjusted for the estimation error in the inverse Mill's ratio.  Estimation takes account
of the correlation of errors for recipients who appear in the data multiple times.  
North Carolina
1997
Missouri
1993 1997
Appendix Table A-1: Estimates for Regression Equations Predicting Current Quarterly Earnings, Controlling for Self-Selection into 
Job Category
Total annual earnings two years 
prior * 1000
Percent of previous 8 quarters 
working
Working all of previous 8 qtrs
No work in any of previous 8 
quarters
Total annual earnings in the prior 
year *1000
Education lower than 12 years
On welfare 7-12 months in prior 
2 years
On welfare 13-23 months in 
prior 2 years
On welfare 24 months in prior 2 
years
No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but none 
in Temp Help No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but none 
in Temp 
Help
Constant 2950.014 5046.317 -17533.42 4448.406 2385.021 -6147.823 13649.09 4162.094 2237.36 8004.139 14613.92 3927.033
(524.150) (15295.150) (16756.630) (11018.960) (635.130) (15382.030) (12894.480) (5924.987) (674.461) (4695.544) (5246.276) (2135.080)
Age 15.01 291.11 968.61 380.32 112.08 527.75 164.67 316.16 124.07 160.09 70.06 182.65
(25.735) (298.834) (342.617) (239.741) (33.630) (274.342) (416.584) (124.897) (30.287) (236.773) (277.196) (94.316)
Age square *100 -89.71 -425.06 -1337.32 -420.82 -240.09 -741.25 -88.86 -396.71 -200.47 -150.20 50.19 -216.54
(32.818) (480.119) (560.714) (237.539) (45.567) (438.906) (723.619) (163.222) (41.188) (392.369) (461.426) (137.574)
-1251.00 -2561.01 -3266.04 -2641.22 -1692.26 -3041.44 -3147.08 -3140.74 -1443.14 -2473.80 -2060.43 -2296.92
(74.514) (461.216) (631.815) (467.455) (105.533) (359.793) (360.128) (176.340) (103.449) (260.831) (280.235) (134.369)
Nonwhite -5.77 44.20 588.53 32.09 -446.53 -184.08 -393.90 -167.77 -225.57 -377.09 641.58 50.37
(104.149) (1249.438) (1322.456) (394.323) (153.377) (1257.249) (763.697) (254.634) (113.837) (501.230) (385.692) (174.211)
Number of children -109.21 -596.37 -702.10 -382.36 -60.84 -335.75 -541.25 -291.52 4.79 -26.40 -26.10 -31.08
(26.180) (164.349) (287.391) (113.981) (38.938) (169.086) (178.658) (84.241) (47.189) (148.119) (154.791) (78.477)
Age of the youngest child 29.61 -59.82 -79.60 -51.16 -16.39 -152.59 -167.72 -85.55 -51.22 -88.45 -128.83 -61.53
(11.133) (77.516) (134.367) (77.098) (15.377) (74.100) (66.105) (38.761) (14.625) (48.909) (54.476) (26.876)
-16.95 177.76 524.50 1276.00 147.26 1025.45 1423.47 1354.36 -302.66 -44.44 5.64 742.09
(83.414) (618.962) (734.041) (491.417) (111.680) (499.881) (502.790) (316.008) (107.258) (381.297) (410.614) (216.262)
52.13 -699.61 135.34 1101.88 315.89 1105.96 1624.07 1599.11 -324.32 19.40 248.69 759.12
(93.052) (618.990) (702.940) (470.010) (121.850) (535.519) (463.963) (360.411) (112.138) (400.528) (401.176) (313.031)
9.68 -855.38 -254.42 1036.67 780.68 790.09 2627.30 2465.23 121.75 775.81 580.14 1979.14
(97.831) (668.859) (951.925) (466.595) (141.303) (567.895) (571.842) (504.518) (133.374) (505.713) (524.849) (440.303)
73.32 -771.22 501.90 -3192.52 293.82 -993.17 -5932.98 -3800.95 -1606.59 -2834.40 -6209.42 -2101.07
(636.677) (2759.177) (3321.710) (6723.817) (741.512) (2100.008) (2663.276) (2182.493) (961.098) (1033.978) (1260.362) (972.659)
-771.41 -1158.80 -965.26 -990.64 -999.13 74.34 -322.37 -167.71 -876.56 494.40 938.41 368.39
(327.354) (1262.815) (1168.373) (785.605) (318.431) (806.162) (529.493) (300.308) (336.829) (566.991) (497.355) (286.310)
46.13 39.94 -508.08 1177.09 611.86 963.72 2482.48 459.23 810.32 1418.63 -268.20 -296.54
(168.562) (1383.282) (2072.273) (5180.344) (199.399) (1666.427) (1327.115) (2472.677) (271.798) (733.668) (1042.223) (899.754)
85.41 733.48 816.01 552.57 126.90 808.14 815.54 868.60 130.30 688.33 706.30 856.32
(71.061) (153.370) (200.580) (660.379) (69.465) (132.578) (72.762) (351.773) (93.114) (67.336) (65.753) (139.955)
242.91 362.31 274.88 468.41 319.15 369.36 560.27 466.36 382.38 423.79 430.40 366.02
(43.555) (156.069) (143.340) (387.404) (50.088) (138.304) (81.496) (125.004) (66.542) (113.803) (78.796) (94.156)
St. Louis central -110.79 -439.92 3411.00 2067.41 165.03 2879.81 2663.45 2541.99 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(107.441) (2060.587) (1939.221) (589.519) (152.694) (1237.665) (837.417) (270.331)
Kansas City central 176.33 313.64 3922.93 1928.21 560.94 2689.35 2130.40 2767.79 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(130.483) (2088.122) (2335.676) (296.192) (194.842) (1472.653) (1094.930) (402.672)
Charlotte central n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 336.47 1656.20 1210.55 1186.90
(167.184) (477.361) (549.650) (247.769)
Suburban metro 467.3197 -58.57 2327.39 1263.28 807.3162 1385.62 761.79 1904.44 451.59 1321.65 424.03 1007.78
(151.077) (2156.926) (2323.367) (542.850) (217.453) (1343.566) (1020.780) (391.484) (264.680) (624.037) (831.756) (364.096)
Small metro 175.33 -845.39 2423.20 494.97 272.08 -377.10 -1036.79 529.35 136.73 417.47 104.79 436.59
(130.354) (1525.989) (1943.385) (233.173) (175.411) (1023.937) (1047.379) (233.254) (106.359) (291.938) (314.099) (139.192)
Quarter 2 -40.80 -313.26 -421.06 -277.15 -234.66 190.82 -1186.69 -336.02 -326.82 -57.65 -1217.33 -99.66
(39.340) (311.624) (661.797) (827.097) (58.977) (396.595) (628.312) (213.165) (77.562) (211.173) (302.078) (102.644)
Quarter 3 -192.26 -78.75 8.81 -260.65 -646.91 -342.16 -977.91 -379.42 -774.23 -250.44 -1216.56 -155.34
(65.804) (542.144) (1058.268) (1250.939) (88.155) (525.959) (753.248) (384.941) (110.133) (258.136) (352.630) (123.589)
Quarter 4 11.92 131.41 -210.81 -260.98 -434.51 -411.91 -1385.91 -622.96 -617.95 -684.45 -1809.33 -677.28
(67.160) (613.969) (1038.988) (1240.508) (78.911) (395.105) (746.372) (336.953) (66.574) (259.929) (355.230) (81.875)
Lambda 3272.27 309.66 4293.85 -1980.73 3283.79 3039.09 -1792.84 304.30 4126.49 -416.60 -1303.06 2032.95
(797.709) (3937.927) (4346.960) (10232.980) (916.216) (4765.997) (2742.797) (5472.752) (1183.317) (1485.739) (1162.456) (1616.570)
N 209,325 6,230 3,744           69,861         129,440     9,921           7,485           72,596 130,894 12,148 10,073 95,254
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  All standrard errors have been adjusted for the estimation error in the inverse Mill's ratio.  Estimation takes account of the correlation of 
errors for recipients who appear in the data multiple times.  
Total annual earnings two 
years prior * 1000
Percent of previous 8 
quarters working
Working all of previous 8 
qtrs
No work in any of 
previous 8 quarters
Total annual earnings in 
the prior year *1000
Appendix Table A-2  Estimates for Regression Equations Predicting Total Earnings in Subsequent Eight Quarters, Controlling for Self-Selection into Job 
Category
On welfare 24 months in 
prior 2 years
19971993
North Carolina
1997
Education lower than 12 
years
On welfare 7-12 months in 
prior 2 years
On welfare 13-23 months 
in prior 2 years
Missouri
No Job
Job in 
Temp 
Help
Job in 
Temp Help 
and Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help No Job
Job in 
Temp 
Help
Job in 
Temp Help 
and Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help
Constant 537.57 1846.11 -3528.67 759.52 206.01 -279.27 1787.27 675.87 334.54 1234.53 1749.37 501.60
(101.357) (2834.228) (2728.077) (1046.970) (122.023) (1591.796) (1509.506) (645.646) (127.077) (731.193) (758.787) (232.437)
Age 5.31 -15.10 124.07 32.16 26.21 56.56 -17.67 29.48 24.00 11.30 -2.54 16.70
(5.123) (56.194) (61.132) (26.076) (6.470) (38.906) (48.425) (15.808) (5.494) (29.719) (35.701) (11.390)
Age square *100 -21.61 20.71 -178.72 -35.08 -51.42 -79.18 38.81 -46.35 -46.99 -11.56 13.72 -24.80
(6.481) (90.930) (98.284) (29.157) (8.688) (62.017) (80.907) (21.788) (7.346) (48.522) (58.828) (17.333)
-273.14 -437.54 -444.80 -411.88 -311.06 -418.93 -365.83 -453.03 -279.27 -338.10 -298.47 -350.04
(15.956) (84.955) (112.515) (49.723) (20.748) (55.776) (61.579) (26.939) (19.794) (45.196) (47.843) (23.660)
Nonwhite -5.02 88.81 152.30 70.08 -128.61 -15.84 -37.90 -17.14 -27.67 -8.93 137.15 60.22
(20.850) (246.396) (241.645) (47.090) (31.225) (142.587) (112.452) (38.834) (22.486) (80.083) (65.133) (27.333)
Number of children -18.40 -81.60 -98.79 -54.34 -12.52 -36.53 -44.87 -30.88 -5.55 24.83 19.39 -15.37
(5.429) (33.647) (57.012) (15.281) (7.705) (25.078) (28.289) (12.902) (9.346) (27.029) (24.980) (11.716)
Age of the youngest child 6.34 -9.02 -2.03 -4.44 -4.59 -28.67 -21.15 -8.61 -11.16 -9.77 -12.81 -5.88
(2.351) (14.297) (27.292) (8.567) (2.980) (9.995) (10.920) (5.238) (2.749) (8.160) (8.911) (3.185)
9.59 101.30 117.91 118.25 50.08 211.09 247.32 159.18 -66.99 -79.30 -93.16 45.54
(16.248) (109.528) (134.608) (52.266) (21.937) (79.748) (91.996) (41.011) (20.207) (70.369) (72.779) (23.472)
24.88 -37.09 82.87 111.04 73.11 205.79 220.39 206.83 -59.69 -67.04 -50.86 51.44
(18.137) (103.587) (141.725) (52.772) (23.560) (77.375) (77.346) (44.891) (21.120) (68.360) 69.88472. (29.920)
41.02 9.13 12.34 106.65 181.17 144.30 271.05 296.80 48.65 42.23 -17.76 262.32
(19.235) (112.474) (154.435) (55.928) (27.671) (84.028) (92.571) (59.624) (25.017) (79.814) (86.371) (63.114)
-70.81 -159.42 478.57 -209.53 -144.28 -328.51 -766.54 -438.24 -312.50 -257.77 -639.11 -152.56
(118.560) (442.962) (522.778) (633.517) (135.086) (256.208) (373.951) (243.982) (170.664) (142.928) (202.207) (167.912)
-108.66 -143.97 -206.41 -92.85 -204.70 13.36 65.49 31.89 -165.62 32.06 132.30 36.22
(61.240) (236.195) (200.410) (86.499) (59.219) (117.004) (92.939) (48.719) (62.741) (91.765) (77.410) (32.439)
8.69 16.82 -187.88 79.85 154.95 82.89 144.52 36.47 152.83 176.85 -61.85 -76.81
(32.079) (284.191) (370.432) (486.437) (38.188) (173.754) (204.177) (257.060) (51.017) (112.665) (166.069) (90.097)
3.81 93.82 112.99 69.10 2.66 110.55 115.62 101.92 11.99 93.62 97.46 109.37
(11.938) (25.255) (43.257) (62.643) (12.851) (16.100) (12.912) (36.233) (16.523) (10.808) (10.737) (138.592)
48.53 70.87 28.94 56.85 60.69 56.84 72.27 62.88 69.29 51.56 50.01 46.58
(8.009) (27.060) (23.446) (36.500) (8.482) (16.763) (14.180) (14.087) (11.535) (11.539) (11.422) (9.624)
St. Louis central -15.23 -146.63 797.65 240.15 62.99 407.85 469.50 342.82 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(21.558) (364.999) (317.141) (62.443) (31.092) (156.789) (110.813) (41.590)
Kansas City central 21.24 -35.47 804.85 216.64 106.16 285.84 411.96 360.64 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(25.668) (369.514) (392.301) (44.484) (38.868) (181.987) (137.642) (52.311)
Charlotte central n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 94.08 270.82 305.83 215.95
(33.039) (81.557) (94.155) (30.367)
Suburban metro 98.21804 -23.79 586.94 178.93 142.2807 61.59 183.02 283.35 76.88 145.48 168.75 169.98
32.1256 (380.044) (377.470) (62.437) (41.684) (168.273) (142.932) (55.172) (48.130) (121.210) (154.719) (42.558)
Small metro 35.18802 -257.67 527.24 61.83 47.79 -88.92 -45.88 97.91 32.35 38.04 -16.10 82.15
(26.587) (269.070) (316.161) (36.360) (35.600) (144.769) (133.343) (38.931) (20.331) (47.752) (52.400) (28.695)
Quarter 2 25.65 6.11 69.89 50.72 40.77 155.51 83.34 138.58 12.77 175.03 1.95 110.26
(7.466) (61.241) (120.604) (78.664) (11.292) (51.393) (83.213) (24.953) (14.588) (36.167) (55.100) (11.540)
Quarter 3 -14.30 46.90 114.24 -8.88 13.15 167.77 202.56 166.59 -43.89 141.68 11.08 80.72
(12.505) (104.255) (200.090) (118.384) (17.001) (64.775) (100.126) (42.577) (20.399) (44.805) (61.800) (13.838)
Quarter 4 76.90 181.26 267.67 137.94 129.33 288.69 397.46 304.58 35.05 120.52 91.89 149.50
(12.872) (125.287) (179.692) (117.792) (16.060) (59.242) (101.986) (39.363) (12.823) (46.462) (62.679) (53.427)
Lambda 584.08 -53.39 865.38 -152.86 719.27 255.08 -136.57 55.63 656.42 -97.65 -90.47 325.83
(148.281) (763.43) (747.43) (960.41) (175.573) (481.714) (411.040) (570.409) (216.980) (239.147) (184.193) (185.669)
N 209,325 6,230 3,744         69,861       129,440     9,921         7,485         72,596 130,894 12,148 10,073 95,254
Note: Standard erros are in parentheses.  All standard errors have been adjusted for the estimation error in the inverse Mill's ratio.  Estimation takes account of the correlation of 
errors for recipients who appear in the data multiple times.  
1997
North Carolina
1993 1997
Missouri
Appendix Table A-3: Estimates for Regression Equations Predicting Earnings in the Eighth Quarter after Reference Quarter, Controlling for Self-
Selection into Job Category
Total annual earnings two 
years prior * 1000
Percent of previous 8 
quarters working
Working all of previous 8 
qtrs
No work in any of 
previous 8 quarters
Total annual earnings in 
the prior year *1000
Education lower than 12 
years
On welfare 7-12 months 
in prior 2 years
On welfare 13-23 months 
in prior 2 years
On welfare 24 months in 
prior 2 years
No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but none
in Temp 
Help
Constant 0.518 1.226 0.794 0.623 0.472 0.312 0.634 0.453 0.444 0.886 1.1526 0.845
(0.041) (0.524) (0.478) (0.099) (0.050) (0.252) (0.301) (0.070) (0.049) (0.163) (0.158) (0.053)
Age 0.001 -0.003 0.030 0.017 0.019 0.025 0.016 0.029 0.004 0.006 -0.002 0.005
(.002) (.013) (.013) (.004) (.003) (.009) (.009) (.004) (.003) (.006) (.006) (.002)
Age square *100 -0.001 0.014 -0.030 -0.016 -0.030 -0.031 -0.017 -0.039 0.000 -0.004 0.009 -0.001
(.004) (.022) (.021) (.006) (.005) (.014) (.014) (.006) (.004) (.009) (.009) (.003)
-0.066 -0.076 -0.054 -0.094 -0.079 -0.082 -0.070 -0.079 -0.026 -0.017 -0.029 -0.032
(.006) (.023) (.027) (.008) (.007) (.015) (.016) (.007) (.008) (.013) (.013) (.006)
Nonwhite -0.088 -0.165 -0.151 -0.121 -0.134 -0.097 -0.112 -0.121 -0.137 -0.146 -0.122 -0.104
(.007) (.049) (.040) (.010) (.010) (.025) (.026) (.008) (.007) (.017) (.013) (.005)
Number of children -0.004 -0.011 -0.030 -0.017 -0.018 -0.020 -0.023 -0.018 -0.002 0.014 0.008 0.004
(.002) (.009) (.011) (.004) (.003) (.007) (.007) (.004) (.004) (.007) (.007) (.003)
Age of the youngest child 0.012 0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.006
(.001) (.004) (.004) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001) (.001) (.002) (.002) (.001)
-0.075 -0.050 -0.071 -0.033 -0.048 -0.011 -0.030 -0.029 -0.002 0.001 -0.034 0.010
(.006) (.028) (.030) (.008) (.006) (.018) (.019) (.006) (.006) (.015) (.014) (.006)
-0.133 -0.125 -0.105 -0.086 -0.095 -0.077 -0.070 -0.064 -0.040 -0.047 -0.044 -0.020
(.007) (.028) (.029) (.009) (.007) (.017) (.018) (.007) (.008) (.015) (.015) (.006)
-0.216 -0.173 -0.160 -0.128 -0.145 -0.126 -0.075 -0.080 -0.081 -0.073 -0.060 -0.020
(.007) (.031) (.032) (.011) (.009) (.021) (.022) (.009) (.009) (.019) (.020) (.008)
-0.028 -0.156 -0.224 -0.153 -0.037 -0.062 -0.113 -0.091 -0.320 -0.062 -0.168 -0.129
(.031) (.092) (.103) (.053) (.038) (.051) (.075) (.026) (.041) (.033) (.045) (.022)
-0.032 0.008 0.012 -0.036 -0.026 0.015 0.012 0.007 -0.103 0.011 -0.009 0.003
(.014) (.049) (.039) (.014) (.014) (.027) (.023) (.010) (.015) (.020) (.018) (.008)
-0.010 0.077 0.030 0.083 0.023 0.033 -0.037 0.047 0.089 0.025 0.080 0.080
(.010) (.052) (.067) (.037) (.013) (.028) (.043) (.015) (.015) (.028) (.034) (.015)
0.002 0.016 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.014 0.013 0.009 -0.028 0.004 0.005 0.001
(.003) (.005) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.004) (.002) (.002) (.001)
Missouri
On welfare 24 months in 
prior 2 years
Percent of previous 8 
quarters working
Working all of previous 8 
qtrs
No work in any of previous
8 quarters
Total annual earnings in 
the prior year *1000
Appendix Table A-4: Regression Predicting Probability of Leaving Welfare Eight Quarters Later, Controlling for Self-Selection into Job Category
North Carolina
1993 1997 1997
Education lower than 12 
years
On welfare 7-12 months in 
prior 2 years
On welfare 13-23 months 
in prior 2 years
No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but 
none in 
Temp Help No Job
Job in Temp 
Help
Job in Temp 
Help and 
Other 
Industry
Job, but none
in Temp 
Help
0.003 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.020 0.004 0.006 0.008
(.002) (.004) (.004) (.003) (.002) (.002) (.003) (.001) 0.002.23 (.002) (.002) (.001)
St. Louis central -0.108 -0.197 -0.155 -0.085 -0.150 -0.123 -0.115 -0.103 na na na na
(.008) (.070) (.065) (.012) (.011) (.031) (.027) (.010)
Kansas City central -0.068 -0.189 -0.179 -0.076 -0.052 -0.073 -0.078 -0.054 na na na na
(.009) (.071) (.074) (.012) (.012) (.034) (.032) (.010)
Charlotte central na na na na na na na na -0.092 -0.090 -0.095 -0.091
(0.013) (0.020) (0.020) (0.010)
Suburban metro -0.011 -0.158 -0.098 -0.005 0.014 -0.006 -0.058 -0.001 -0.005 0.034 -0.007 0.002
(.010) (.070) (.073) (.012) (0.011) (0.032) (0.029) (0.009) (0.018) (0.026) (0.027) (0.012)
Small metro -0.001 -0.079 -0.092 -0.022 0.007 0.021 -0.022 -0.005 -0.018 -0.009 -0.047 -0.029
(.011) (.058) (.064) (.012) (.011) (.028) (.030) (.009) (.007) (.013) (.013) (.005)
Quarter 2 0.004 0.006 -0.016 -0.010 0.006 0.027 -0.002 -0.003 -0.010 0.012 -0.019 -0.002
(.002) (.015) (.025) (.007) (.003) (.011) (.019) (.003) (.004) (.010) (.012) (.003)
Quarter 3 0.010 -0.008 -0.043 -0.013 0.001 0.016 -0.013 -0.005 -0.008 0.018 -0.020 0.008
(.004) (.022) (.035) (.010) (.005) (.014) (.021) (.004) (.006) (.012) (.015) (.004)
Quarter 4 0.026 -0.003 -0.042 -0.001 -0.002 0.006 -0.026 -0.025 0.029 0.026 -0.012 0.027
(.004) (.024) (.036) (.010) (.005) (.014) (.021) (.005) (.004) (.012) (.015) (.004)
Lambda 0.074 -0.173 -0.150 -0.158 0.064 0.041 -0.001 -0.053 0.457 -0.105 -0.112 -0.134
(.040) (.135) (.127) (.072) (.053) (.067) (.084) (.033) (.054) (.053) (.045) (.027)
N 209,325 6,230 3,744         69,861       129,440     9,921         7,485         72,596 130,894 12,148 10,073 95,254
Missouri
1997
Total annual earnings two 
years prior * 1000
Appendix Table A-4: Continued
North Carolina
1993
Note: Standard erros are in parentheses.  All standard errors have been adjusted for the estimation error in the inverse Mill's ratio.  Estimation takes account of the correlation 
of errors for recipients who appear in the data multiple times.  
1997
